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TRADITIONAL HUNTING 
Cultural rights v animal welfare 
DOMINIQUETHIRIET 
The traditional right to hunt has been recognised for some time now by Australian courts and 
by Parliament as one of the native title rights 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. I 
Concomitantly growing commLJnity concerns have 
emerged about the cruelty of common traditional 
hunting practices'> These practices include harpooning 
and drowning of dugongs; harpooning of turtles or 
killing them with blows to the head; keeping sea turtles 
upside down and freshwater turtles in drums for 
lengthy periods; breaking the necks of mutton bird chicks; 
and breaking, severing or tethering animals' limbs as a 
means of control and storage.3 Increasingly, Indigenous 
communities are providing leadership by actively 
promoting more humane hunting methods' 
The welfare of animals subject to traditional hunting 
is treated inconsistently under the various State and 
Territory animal protection regimes. In Queensland, acts 
performed under Aboriginal tradition orTorres Strait 
Islander custom are exempt from the requirements of 
the Animal Care and Protection Act 200 1.5 In contrast, the 
Northern Territory's Animal Welfare Act 1999 specifically 
exc:ludes the possibility of using cultural, religious or 
traditional practices as a defence to an act of cruelty.6 
In other Australian jurisdictions, traditional hunting is 
not specifically mentioned and falls under the general 
provisions of the relevant animal protection legislation, 
or is exempt, along with other forms of hLJnting? 
The discrepancies between the application of animal 
protection laws to manifestly cruel Indigenous traditional 
hunting practices and to other forms of c:ruelty raise 
potential issues of discrimination. 
Exemptions under animal protection 
legislation in Queensland 
In its 1986 report, The Recognition of Aboriginal 
Customary Laws," the Australian Law Reform 
Commission warned of the undesirability of legal 
pluralism, a system which allows the enactment of 
special rules for particular groups, on the basis that 
plul<llist systems can generate, rightJy or wrongly 
apprehension of discrimination_9 
The Racial Discrimination Ac:I: 1975 (Cth) (RDA), along 
witI'. State and Territory anti-discrimination enactments, 
gives effect to a number of international agreements, 
and particularly to the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination and to the Intemational 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 10 Under these 
agreemen'ts and under the RDA, II the differential 
treatment of peoples on the basis of race is unlawful. 
Differentiation of treatment, however, will not constitute 
discrimination if it is not 'invidious', or 'if the criteria for 
such differentiation, judged against the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention, are legitimate'." 
As noted above, traditional hunting practices are 
exempt from the cruelty provisions of the Animal 
Care and Protection Act 200 I (Qld),'3 even though 
the same actions conducted outside the scope 
of traditional hunting would constitute SeVel"e 
offenc:es under the Act. Furthermore, even in the 
jurisdictions where animal protection equally applies 
to traditional hunting, there appears to be a tendency 
by enforcement agencies to 'tum a blind eye'to the 
potential c:ruelty involved in traditional hunting because 
of the sensitive c:ultural issues raised and bec:ause of the 
difficulties in collecting evidence for prosecution." All 
in all, the immunity, at both legislative and procedural 
levels, may give rise to concerns that Indigenous 
people are treated more leniently than non-Indigenous 
people fOI' cruelty to animals. It is argued below that 
such concerns are justified because allowing c:ruelty in 
traditional hunting practices, by exclusion or omission 
from legislation, goes beyond what is necessary for 
giving effect to native title rights. 
Cruelty immunity a special measure? 
The immunity from cruelty offences which is granted to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders under the Animal 
Core and Protection Act 200 I (Qld) has been described 
as a special measure consistent with the RDAII It is 
argued, however. that such description is misguided.The 
RDA allows for special rneasures l6 in accordance with 
the Convemion on the Elimination of all Forms of Rac:iol 
Discrimination (art I): 
Special measures taken ror the sole purpose of securing 
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or 
individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in 
ordel- to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment 
or exel-cise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall 
not be deemed racial discriminc.tion, provided, howevec 
that such measures do not as a consequence, lead to the 
maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups 
and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for 
which tney were taken have been achieved_ 
For most traditional practices, the method (as opposed 
to the purpose) of hunting animals has no particular 
cultural significance and is not immutable. 17 New 
technologies such as motor vehicles, dinghies, firearms, 
metal spearheads, nylon fishing lines and refrigeration 
are now widely used by Indigenous hunters.l" Embracing 
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such new technologies has in no way diminished the 
cultural significance of the hunt. Likewise, the ;,,:loption 
of methods of killing animals in ways that ensure 
quick and painless death would not jeopardise the 
traditional status of the hunting practices, I' Thus, the 
laws and practices which allow Indigenous hunters to 
use cruel hunting methods that would otherwise be 
prohibited under relevant animal protection legislation, 
are not special measures. They do nothing to 'secure 
advancement' of Indigenous people nor do they ensure 
'equal enjoyment of their human rights' (in this case 
the right to conduct traditional activities) as such 
rights could be equally enjoyed using altemative 'more 
humane' hunting techniques. Furthec they provide 
traditional hunters with a 'separate right' in the form 
of a legislative or procedural immunity from animal 
welfare I"equirements. It should be noted, however. 
that similar immunity is available in some States to 
allow the slaughtel· of animals under a religious faith, 
for instance ritual Ko.,her and Halal slaughter.'o I argue 
that in all these circumstances, the cruelty exemption is 
inconsistent with the object of art I of the Convention 
and as a result, this exemption falls short of what a 
special measure ought to achieve. 
There may be a limited number of circumstances where 
the exemption could be regal-ded as a special measure. 
This would apply when a cruel method of killing has 
a traditional significance, and thus the cruelty is an 
inherent and traditional pal"t of the practice.The label of 
'special measure', however. could still be rejected as this 
term generally implies the law is mel-ely an affirmative 
action measure temporarily in place until the effect of 
the discrimination has been removed." This clearly does 
not apply to any of these situations. 
SPEARED BY' AN INDIGENOUS 
tRADITIONAL HuNTER OR S~OT 
BY A SPORlING- SHooTER? 
There is an important difference between animal 
protection laws which regulate the right to hunt and 
laws which recognise the native title right to hunt.The 
latter do not amount to discrimination even though 
they authorise Indegenous people to hunt protected 
species and to hunt them in protected areas:and this 
right is by and large denied non-Indigenous people.22 
This is simply because native title is a pre-existing right 
of cl"ucial cultural significance to Indigenous peoples21 
Are animal protection laws discriminatory? 
Could the discrimination argument be used in the 
reverse by claiming that, in jurisdictions where anti~ 
CI"uelty standards are imposed on Indigenous as well 
as on non· Indigenous peoples, limitations to traditional 
hunting discriminate, either directly or indirectly, against 
Indigenous peoples because they hinder exercise of 
their cultural right? Clearly, legislation which limits native 
title rights generally breaches the RDA.'• This is because 
native title is a property right and thus any limitation 
will pel·rorce be discriminatory if not similarly applied 
to other property rights. However; for several reasons, 
anti-cruelty limitations that apply to traditional hunting 
practices in States other than Queensland do not 
amount to discrimination. 
First, anti-cruelty legislation, although cleady affecting 
the I"ight to hunt, does not limit the nature and the 
amount of property to be taken. It simply regulates how 
it should be taken (of COUI"se it is also acknowledged 
that the traditional right to hunt is more than a mere 
property right). Second, there is no direct discrimination 
as anti.cruelty legislation that may apply to traditional 
hunting applies equally - 01" equally fails to apply,5 
- to hunting conducted by other cultural groups. 
Third, while both the International Covenant on Civil and 
Politicol Rights and the RDA prohibit laws that impose 
restrictions on some groups based 011 race, art 18(3) of 
the Covel'1ant entitles States 'to impose such limitations 
as al"e necessary to protect public safety, order, health 
or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedom of 
others.' It is argued that any regulation which aims to 
limit cruel treatment of animals does so in the interest 
of moral wnsidel·ation. Article 18(3) is not given effect 
in the RDA but there would be no impediment to State 
and Territol"y governments applying this principle rt is 
argued, therefore, that the imposition of anti-cruelty 
standards on Indigenous peoples amounts to neither 
direct nOI· indirect bl"each of the RDA. 
State intervention 
The question of whether the state should intervene 
to curb cultural practices deemed unacceptable to 
the majority because they conflict with human rights 
principles has been subject to public debate and, on 
occasion, court pmceedings, 
Disputed practices have involved the right of Indigenous 
men to consummate a traditionally arranged marriage 
against the human right of the child bride not to 
be subjected to sex;" the right of Indigenous men 
to 'discipline their women';" as well as Indigenous 
communities' right to dispense customary law against 
Increasingly, Indigenous communities are providing leadership 
by actively promoting more humane hunting methods, 
the right of the offender not to be physically harmed 
by payback woundingl6 To address these difhcult 
issues, Northern Territory courts may have regard 
to Aboriginal customary law when sentencing?' 
Controversy about state intervention. has also applied 
to traditional practices of non-Indigenou~ minol"ities, 
such as female circumcision, promised bl"ides and the 
wearing ofthe hljab. In many cases, actual or proposed 
legislative intervention to cUI"b such traditional practices 
is supported not only by the majority but also within the 
minority communities.'o 
All ofthe examples above refer to state intervention 
where conflicts OCCUI" between the rights of various 
groups of people.There are few precedents of state 
intervention when civil rights of some communities 
infringe on the (yet unrecognised) rights of animals." 
In relation to human rights, Kymlicka12 provides a useful 
model which balances the need for societal organisation 
with self-determination for minority groups when 
conflict arises. Kymlicka equates 'liberal principles' with 
civil rights' and argues that where a minority group 
chooses to deny the civil I"ights of some of its citizens 
contrary to the liberal principles held by the majority 
group, intervention by regulation is warranted (ie not 
discriminatory). It is only WalTanted, howevel~ when 
the breach of civil r-ights reaches a cenain threshold 
of unacceptability, Until this threshold is crossed, 
the majority group 'have to learn to live with the 
incompatibility of the minority gmup's practice With 
liberal principlesB 
These principles could be validly applied to the issue 
of traditional hunting if the phrase 'liberal principles' is 
interpreted broadly as referring to humans as a part of 
their environment. Under this broader interpretation, 
an intervention to regulate the treatment of animals 
subject to traditional hunting would be justified (ie not 
discriminatory) when practices have reached a point 
on the cruelty scale unacceptably inconsistent with 
animal welfal"e standards accepted by the majority. 
Simila~ly, intervention would be sur-ely justified if to 
take an extreme example, the minority group's cultural 
practices were r-esponsible for destroying or polluting 
the environment to such an extent that it was entirely 
unacceptable to the majority 
Conclusion 
It is clear on this analysis that laws and practices which 
exempt Indigenous people from anti-cruelty regulations 
when exercising their traditional right to hunt go beyond 
what is required to comply with anti-discrimination 
principles, In such cases, legal pluralism is not justified. 
On the other hand anti-cruelty regulations, even when 
these somewhat limit the right to hunt, are justified 
and GO not appear to discriminate against Indigenous 
hunters. Given growing community concerns, including 
from within Indigenous communities," about cruelty in 
tr-aditional hunting, legislative reform would be justified 
in all States and in the ACT to ensure that animal 
welfare requir"ements explicitly apply to traditional 
hunting as is currently the r~se in the Northern 
Territory, and that, in all jUrisdictions, the laws are 
properly enforced. 
Despite the legitimacy of state intervention in this 
case, it is doubtful that legislative reform imposed on 
Indigenous communities would be well received.The 
difficulties with enforcing the legislation in r-emote 
areas would also make significant improvements on the 
ground unlikely. Instead, it would be preferable if change 
could originate from, and be driven by, Indigenous 
communities, perhaps initially under the influence of 
concerned individuals.The change process which may 
include education programs targeting huntel"s should be 
assisted, rather than imposed, by government and non-
government organisations where needed. This mode of 
achieving change will not only ensure meaningful animal. 
welfare improvements but will also reinforce Indigenous 
communities' right to self-deter-mination. 
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